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On April 15, 1994, trade ministers from over one hundred contracting parties
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rallied in Marrakesh, Morocco,
to sign the Uruguay Round Final Act. They agreed that the target date for entry
into force of the sweeping new agreements would be January 1, 1995. By signing
the Marrakesh documents, they pledged to seek the enactment of any domestic
measures required to implement their new obligations.
For most nations, the executive decision to adhere to or ratify an international
agreement assures the enactment of necessary implementing legislation. Under
the U.S. constitutional system of checks and balances, however, the President's
authority to negotiate does not include authority to change U.S. law in ways
necessary to implement the agreements resulting from such negotiations. There-
fore, the President submits a bill to the Congress to do so, under "fast track"
procedures.
Note: The American Bar Association grants permission to reproduce this article, or a part thereof,
in any not-for-profit publication or handout provided such material acknowledges original publication
in this issue of The International Lawyer and includes the title of the article and the name of the
authors.
*The authors are partners of Sidley & Austin, in its Washington, D.C., office. Ms. Bello has
served as General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative, Mr. Holmer, as Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative and General Counsel. Both administered the antidumping and countervailing duty
program at the Commerce Department, in addition to other government service.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily represent those of Sidley & Austin or any
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1. Under fast track procedures, the House of Representatives and Senate tentatively pledge to
consider the President's bill under time deadlines for action, free from unraveling amendments.
Trade Act of 1974, §§ 151-154 (as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2194 (1988)). However, the
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In the context of legislation to implement the Final Act, some members of
Congress and the U.S. private sector have expressed concern about the new
World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement procedures. Following the
enactment of implementing legislation and the entry into force of the Final Act,
the U.S. government and the private sector will discern, dissect, and debate
developments in the application of these new procedures. This article identifies
the major concerns about these new procedures, and the reasons why the United
States should benefit from them.
I. Background
In 1947 the United States and Great Britain were the principal architects of the
Bretton Woods System, the tripod of which was the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, and a proposed International Trade Organization (ITO). Chiefly
in response to concerns of the U.S. Senate, the ITO was abandoned, leaving the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as the surviving agreement
of the original, stronger ITO.
From the outset, the GATT included dispute settlement procedures. Parties
to a dispute were encouraged to consult bilaterally or otherwise as appropriate
to seek a mutually satisfactory resolution. In the absence of such resolution,
panels of experts could be convened on an ad hoc basis to review the submissions
of interested parties and to hear their oral arguments. Panel rulings were submitted
initially only to the interested parties, to afford another chance for an amicable
resolution. Panel rulings acquired legal status and force only if adopted by the
GATT Council, composed of all the contracting parties to the GATT.
The system functioned for several decades as more political than legalistic.
The GATT was viewed by many as a forum for negotiating resolutions to disputes,
rather than an adjudicatory body applying GATT law to particular facts. Powerful
countries generally fared well in this system, except perhaps when the dispute
arose between powerful countries. The dispute resolution procedures were gener-
ally slow but effective, except in major agricultural disputes, and then particularly
when the disputants were the United States and the European Community.
Significant complaints about the system arose, however. The consultative phase
could be unproductively long; the party whose measures were challenged could
simply drag out the bilateral discussions. Even after parties agreed to the establish-
ment of a panel, they encountered difficulties in agreeing on the terms of reference,
panelists, and procedures for making submissions to the panel. The panel phase
of the process was easily extended by fractious disputants or scheduling problems
with the panelists. The credibility of the panelists as independent and objective
Constitution authorizes the House and Senate each to establish its own rules of proceedings. U.S.
CON ST. art. I, § 5. Therefore, either body may modify such rules without regard to statutory fast-track
procedures.
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was questioned, since nearly all were representatives of a contracting party to
the GATT.
If the panel issued an unsound, unsupported report, the GATT had no mecha-
nism for appealing it. Even if a panel finally issued a report, a single contracting
party-including the disputant to whom it was adverse-could block its adoption
by the GATT Council. Even if the GATT Council adopted a report, nothing
could guarantee that the party whose measure was deemed to be inconsistent
with the GATT would withdraw it or pay compensation to the adversely affected
party or parties. Neither was there any guarantee that the GATT Council, as a
last resort, would authorize the adversely affected party or parties to withdraw
concessions of equivalent value, that is, retaliate. Finally, no procedure existed
to ensure that the GATT Council would monitor the action or inaction of a party
whose measures were found to be GATT-inconsistent, unless prompted by the
initiative of the party that successfully challenged those measures.
For better or worse, the United States is surely one of the most litigious
nations on earth, with a record or near record number of lawyers per capita.
The nation was founded to establish a democracy based upon a Constitution
and the rule of law. Our system is based upon majority rule, with protection
of minority rights; our tripartite government is designed in part to prevent
the abuse of power (by diffusing it through three branches, with checks and
balances) and ensure that the laws enacted through such a complex legislative
process are indeed enforced.
With America's historical and cultural background, it is not surprising that
the United States viewed the GATT dispute settlement system with considerable
misgivings. In the highly political context of GATT Council meetings and panel-
ists who were normally representatives of GATT member governments, U.S.
GATT experts-often, though not always, lawyers themselves-felt the United
States would benefit from a more legalistic, more American, system of settling
disputes. A more judicial approach to the resolution of GATT disputes would
promote certainty in commercial trading relations and the international rule of
law, of which the United States was the chief champion.
The United States' frustration with the GATT dispute settlement process was
reflected in repeated congressional calls for reform. In the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act of 1988, the first listed trade negotiating objective for the
United States was "to provide for more effective and expeditious dispute settle-
ment mechanisms and procedures . . . and enable better enforcement of United
States rights." 2
2. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § I 101(b)(1), 102
Stat. 1107 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(1) (1988)). In the Senate Finance Committee's report
on S. 490, the Omnibus Trade Act of 1987 (which led to the 1988 Act), the Committee stated,
"dispute resolution is now a process that often takes several years to resolve, leaving uncertainty
in trading relations with regard to the products and issues involved and undermining support for
trade agreements." S. REp. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1987).
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In view of the decidedly different histories, cultures, governments, and legal
systems of other GATT contracting parties, it should not be surprising that many
other parties preferred the more political approach to resolving disputes. Many
saw clarity, certainty, and the rule of law as not necessarily of more value than
diplomacy, negotiations, and flexibility in view of changing conditions and cir-
cumstances. The United States, then, for many years was fairly isolated in advo-
cating modifications to the GATT dispute settlement system that would enhance
the rule of law and decrease the opportunity for a pragmatic political resolution.
The rules were changed in some useful, but relatively minor, respects beginning
with the Tokyo Round. In addition to many other codes addressing nontariff
barriers to trade, supplementary to the GATT itself, the Tokyo Round issued a
"Framework Agreement" on GATT dispute settlement. Key changes were to
try to enhance the prospect of a more timely resolution, and to stress that panelists
could be drawn from sources other than GATT representatives of contracting
parties stationed in Geneva.
The Tokyo Round was concluded and implemented into U.S. law in 1979.
The United States began advocating the initiation of an eighth round of multilateral
trade negotiations just three years later. However, not until a ministerial meeting
in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986 did the GATT Secretariat and
contracting parties agree to do so. Named after the site of that ministerial assem-
bly, the Uruguay Round encompassed negotiations on an extremely broad range of
trade-related issues, including how to improve the dispute settlement procedures.
Launched in 1986, the Uruguay Round was scheduled to conclude in 1990.
To enhance the prospects of remaining on schedule, trade ministers convened in
Montreal, Canada, in December 1988 for a Midterm Review. In most negotiating
groups, the major achievement of the Midterm Review was simply to outline
the procedures for further progress and identify the issues that needed to be
addressed. The dispute settlement group, on the other hand, concluded an
agreement on procedural reforms to the GATT process. At a follow-up ministerial
meeting in Geneva in April 1989, contracting parties agreed to apply these reforms
on an interim basis, pending the conclusion of the Uruguay Round overall. Thus,
since April 1989, some of the timing problems have been resolved or mitigated.
The Midterm Review reforms, however, did not purport to confront, much
less make, fundamental changes to the existing system. Those changes were
finally accomplished in December 1991 and December 1993. In 1991, following
the second failed attempt to conclude negotiations, the GATT Director-General,
Arthur Dunkel, issued a Draft Final Act to crystallize issues and facilitate closure.
Closure nonetheless eluded the negotiators in Geneva until December 15, 1993
(the last day on which the President could preserve eligibility for "fast track"
treatment of legislation to implement the Round3).
3. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 103-49, § 1102(e), 107 Stat.
239 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2902(e) (1988)).
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With respect to the dispute settlement rules, however, the final agreement
departed only peripherally from the December 1991 "Dunkel text." The new
rules make fundamental changes to the GATT dispute settlement process by
providing for:
* automatic establishment of a panel and automatic adoption of a panel report
(unless the Council, by consensus, decides to the contrary);
* an exceptional opportunity for appellate review of panel reports;
* rigorous surveillance of the implementation of adopted panel reports;
* compensation, or WTO authorization, for the suspension of concessions if
a report is not implemented in a reasonable period of time;
" expeditious arbitration in the event of disputes about a reasonable period
of time for implementation or the appropriate level of compensation or
suspension; and
* recourse to these procedures for practices considered as violating the WTO,
or nullifying or impairing WTO benefits.
As a result of these changes, the resolution of GATT disputes would become
a far more legalistic than political process. The United States, the architect of
these proposals, had prevailed over earlier doubts by many, if not most, con-
tracting parties about the wisdom of such a transformation. How had the United
States succeeded in overcoming earlier, overwhelming opposition?
The answer to that question is that the United States, through its so-called
aggressive "unilateralism" of the late 1980s, converted the rest of the world to
the benefits of a legalistic, rule-based dispute resolution process. Why? Because
the rest of the world had developed a new-found appreciation of international
legal procedures as a way to discipline the United States from acting unilaterally,
perhaps in contravention of its multilateral obligations under the GATT.
By 1985 the U.S. trade deficit was skyrocketing. Alarmed members of Con-
gress introduced over 300 protectionist trade bills by the fall of 1985. The Reagan
administration, determined to avoid the enactment of protectionist legislation,
initiated more aggressive measures to open foreign markets. The objectives: to
restore support for freer trade; obtain better access abroad for U.S. exports of
goods and services; and remain in control of the trade agenda.
Various trade actions pursued by the Reagan and Bush administrations have
been summarized and analyzed earlier in this series of articles.4 The leverage
for opening markets in the latter 1980s and early 1990s, other than through the
slow-moving Uruguay Round, was provided principally by the credible threat
of the use of U.S. sanctions. The engine for such a credible threat was section
4. Alan F. Holmer &Judith H. Bello, The 1988 Trade Bill: Savior or Scourge of the International
Trading System?, 23 INT'L LAW. 523 (1989); Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Unilateral Action
to Open Foreign Markets: The Mechanics of Retaliation Exercises, 22 INT'L LAW. 1197 (1988);
Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, Significant Recent Developments in Section 301 Unfair Trade
Cases, 21 INT'L LAW. 211 (1987).
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301 of the Trade Act of 1974, authorizing chiefly the imposition or increase in
tariffs or imposition of quantitative restrictions, or both, in response to unfair,
injurious trade practices by a foreign government. Section 301 authorized the
President (and, after enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988, the U.S. Trade Representative) to take such measures if a foreign govern-
ment breached a trade agreement or otherwise acted so as to nullify or impair
benefits of the United States under a trade agreement. To this extent, section
301 simply afforded the domestic legal basis for enforcing a trade agreement,
principally the GATT.
However, section 301 further authorizes U.S. actions in response to foreign
government acts, policies, or practices that are deemed unjustifiable, unreason-
able, or discriminatory and that burden or restrict U.S. commerce. This aspect
of section 301 provides domestic legal authority for U.S. sanctions, even in the
absence of a violation of the GATT or nullification or impairment of U.S. GATT
benefits.
The United States jump-started the use of section 301 authority in 1985. Presi-
dent Reagan self-initiated four section 301 investigations in the fall of 1985 of
one Brazilian, one Japanese, and two Korean practices. He acted in five instances
under section 301, even though the U.S. industry concerned had not requested
such action and the U.S. Trade Representative had not conducted a formal investi-
gation. The re-energized section 301 program improved market access or intellec-
tual property protection in cases ranging from Japan (citrus, leather and leather
footwear, tobacco products, semiconductors), Korea (intellectual property, insur-
ance, cigarettes), and India (almonds) to Argentina (soybeans), the European
Community (EC) (citrus, pasta, canned fruit, meat, agricultural products ad-
versely affected by the EC's enlargement to include Spain and Portugal), Canada
(fish), and Taiwan (customs valuation, beer, wine, tobacco products).5
Least important from a commercial perspective but probably most important
from a political perspective, President Reagan imposed retaliatory duties under
section 301. At the beginning of his second administration, following the failure
of the GATT process to resolve a decades-old dispute over EC discriminatory
tariffs on citrus imports, he increased duties on certain imports from the EC.6
(The EC promptly counter-retaliated against imports from the United States-
specifically, imports principally from California.) In 1986 to 1987, in the context
of the enlargement of the EC to include Spain and Portugal, President Reagan
imposed quotas on certain EC products to mirror EC quotas imposed in Portugal
and raised duties to 200 percent on other EC products in response to EC tariff
5. See generally Annual Report of the President of the United States on the Trade Agreements
Program (1988).
6. Proclamation No. 5354, 50 Fed. Reg. 26,143 (1985); Proclamation No. 5363, 50 Fed. Reg.
33,711 (1985).
VOL. 28, NO. 4
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE NEW WTO 1101
increases in Spain.7 He increased duties on other EC products in 1988 in response
to an EC ban on imports of meat treated with growth hormones. 8
President Reagan also temporarily imposed a 15 percent tax on imports of
softwood lumber products from Canada. 9 Further, Reagan is the only President
of the United States ever to have taken section 301 action against Japan: he
increased duties in 1986 on an estimated $24 million of Japanese products (in
connection with an agreement otherwise settling the U.S. complaint about Japa-
nese quotas on leather and leather goods)' and in 1987 increased duties to 100
percent on $300 million worth of Japanese products in response to Japan's breach
of the 1986 semiconductor agreement (negotiated in response to a section 301
petition)."
The perceived success of the section 301 program in the second Reagan admin-
istration ensured its popularity with the U.S. Congress. Congress' response was
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, not only strengthening
section 301,2 but cloning it through Super 301,3 Special 301,1" a telecommunica-
tions section 301-style remedy, 5 and a government procurement procedure based
upon section 301.16
On the other hand, the perceived success of the section 301 program was not
welcomed by trading partners of the United States. Although unable to agree on
how to conclude the Uruguay Round, they were unanimous in their condemnation
of U.S. unilateralism. Section 301's successful application by the United States
induced foreign capitals around the world to see GATT dispute settlement proce-
dures in a new light, as a way to discipline U.S. unilateralism.
Thus, the aggressive use of section 301 ultimately created the climate of wide-
spread political support for the GATT dispute settlement proposals authored
7. Proclamation No. 5478, 51 Fed. Reg. 18,296 (1986); Proclamation No. 5601,52 Fed. Reg.
2663 (1987).
8. Proclamation No. 5759, 52 Fed. Reg. 49,131 (1987).
9. Proclamation No. 5595, 52 Fed. Reg. 229 (1987).
10. Proclamation No. 5448, 51 Fed. Reg. 9435 (1986).
11. Proclamation No. 5631, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,412 (1987).
12. The major amendments to section 301 were the transfer of authority from the President to
the U.S. Trade Representative, the requirement to retaliate in certain cases (subject to flexible excep-
tions), and the expansion of actionable "unreasonable" practices (to include certain worker rights,
specified anticompetitive activity, and export targeting). Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act
of 1988 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1107, 1164; Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer,
The Heart of the 1988 Trade Act: A Legislative History of the Amendments to Section 301, 25 STAN.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1988) [hereinafter Section 301 Amendments].
13. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1302, 102 Stat.
1107, 1176; Section 301 Amendments, supra note 12, at 30.
14. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1303, 102 Stat.
1107, 1179; Section 301 Amendments, supra note 12, at 40.
15. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1371-1382
(Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988), 102 Stat. 1107, 1216.
16. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, title VII (Buy
American Act of 1988), 102 Stat. 1107, 1545.
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by the United States. Ironically, the United States, the chief champion of the
international rule of law, succeeded in its advocacy for a stronger, more effective
dispute settlement system, based upon the rule of law, because the United States
itself was increasingly perceived as an international scofflaw, acting in its self-
interest 7 without regard to international law, rules, or agreements.
II. U.S. Domestic Concern about New Dispute Settlement Procedures
Now that the United States has succeeded in so dramatically improving the
GATT dispute settlement procedures, some in the United States are expressing
concern that the rules may prove disadvantageous to U.S. interests. While the
United States remains a plaintiff in many GATT dispute settlement cases, over
the last few years it has just as often been a defendant. The new rules are as
much a bane for defendants as a boon for plaintiffs.' 8
Concern is even stronger, however, about the effects on continued U.S. efforts
to open markets and improve the protection of intellectual property for the benefit
of all, not just the United States. While these efforts are trade-liberalizing in
motive and, when successful, in outcome, they are often fueled by foreign govern-
ments' fear of U.S. action under section 301 or a section 301-style remedy. Yet
such fear may subside with the inauguration of the new and improved WTO
dispute settlement procedures. Any action by the United States that would violate
the WTO rules may be rapidly and effectively challenged by adversely affected
trading partners. The expectation engendered by the new system-that little coun-
tries as well as big, powerful ones might be able to stand up to U.S. "bullying"
under section 301-could undermine the credibility of the U.S. threat of unilateral
action, and thus the success of section 301-type programs.
III. Net Benefits to the United States of an
Effective Dispute Settlement System
While such concerns are understandable, they should not be permitted to distort
the cost-benefit analysis of the new WTO dispute settlement procedures. Their advan-
tages to the United States outweigh any disadvantages, for the following reasons.
First, the United States likely will continue to be a plaintiff in WTO dispute
settlement proceedings at least as often as it proves to be a defendant. When the
17. In fact, U.S. actions under section 301 generally opened markets around the world on a
most-favored-nation basis, thus benefitting producers and exporters elsewhere as well as in the United
States, in addition to consumers in the country whose market was opened. Arguably section 301 did
more to open markets in the period 1985-1992 than any other international governmental activity,
including the Uruguay Round negotiations. In addition, the use of section 301 and section 301 clones
arguably enabled the United States to achieve better rules in the Uruguay Round in general, and
with regard to dispute settlement and intellectual property protection in particular.
18. Judith H. Bello & Alan F. Holmer, GATT7Dispute Settlement Agreement: Internationalization
or Elimination of Section 301?, 26 INT'L LAW. 795 (1992).
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United States complains about trade barriers that breach the WTO rules or nullify
or impair WTO benefits, it reasonably can expect an expeditious and favorable
resolution.
Second, as the world's largest exporter, the United States has at least as much
interest in the international trading system and the WTO as any other nation on
earth. The WTO dispute settlement procedures will generate confidence that the
WTO rules will be enforced fairly and expeditiously. Such confidence in turn
will strengthen the WTO and increase its market-opening leverage.
Third, in any event, the United States, like all other WTO members, fully
retains its national sovereignty. Even if the United States as a defendant loses
some WTO dispute settlement cases, it is not required to change its law or
practice to come into conformity with a WTO dispute settlement verdict. It has
the option, in accordance with the WTO rules, instead to offer compensation to
adversely affected trading partners or to suffer WTO-authorized countermea-
sures, that is, retaliation, against U.S. exports. Thus, the United States remains
free to take measures that violate the WTO, but it is more likely in the future
to have to pay a price for such action. The new dispute settlement process
thus may yield a more informed cost-benefit analysis of protectionist actions
generally.
Fourth, the prospect of WTO-authorized retaliation against U.S. exports looms
far larger in theory than is likely to occur in practice. Imposing trade sanctions
generally is shooting yourself in the foot: in a global economy, both consumers
and industries that use the sanctioned imports are adversely affected.
Since 1947 insofar as we are aware, in only one GATT dispute settlement
case did the GATT authorize retaliation against the losing party. In 1952 in
response to a complaint by the Netherlands, the GATT Council adopted a dispute
settlement panel determining that U.S. quantitative restrictions on dairy imports
violated article XI of the GATT. Ultimately the GATT contracting parties author-
ized the Netherlands to retaliate against the United States for failure to bring its
practices into conformity with its GATT obligations. Specifically, the Netherlands
was authorized to impose a limit of 60,000 tons on imported wheat flour from
the United States.
Yet the Netherlands declined to exercise this authority. Why? Because such action
would have adversely affected the citizenry generally by likely resulting in higher
prices for bread. The moral: generally everyone loses when a nation takes retaliatory
action. Retaliation will never be the rule, only the exception to the rule. A single
cycle of retaliation and counter-retaliation is enough to demonstrate an administra-
tion's political resolve, but also to incur substantial economic harm.
IV. Conclusion
Like most nations, the United States tends to be schizophrenic; it wants the
benefits of free trade, but also the freedom to act on its own without regard to
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international restraints. It remains the chief champion and cheerleader for the
international rule of law, yet it prizes the sovereign right to act in disregard of
such law in exceptional circumstances.
With these conflicting objectives, the United States will remain uneasy about
the newly effective WTO dispute settlement rules. Yet U.S. national economic
interests benefit substantially from the new system.
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